Private Carl Horace Harper 537772

 

France 15th February 1915 – 30th March 1919.

Essex Yeomanry

 

The Essex Yeomanry was a regiment of the British Army raised in 1797. It recruited volunteers from the county of Essex in the East of England. The Essex Yeomanry is currently 36 (Essex Yeomanry) Signal Squadron, with Sqn HQ at Colchester, and 907 Signal Troop at Chelmsford .

 

The Essex Yeomanry

Active 1797-present

Country Britain

Branch Army

Type Yeomanry

Role Signals

Size Troop

Garrison/HQ Chelmsford

Motto Decus Et Tutamen (Honour and Protection)

Engagements

Second Battle of Ypres

Battle of Frezenberg

Battle of Loos

Battle of Arras

Battle of the Hindenburg Line

Battle of the St Quentin Canal

Pursuit to Mons

 

World War I

In accordance with the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, which brought the Territorial Force into being, the TF was intended to be a home defence force for service during wartime and members of the unit could not be compelled to serve outside the country. However, on the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, many members volunteered for Imperial Service. Therefore, TF units were split in August and September 1914 into 1st Line (liable for overseas service) and 2nd Line (home service for those unable or unwilling to serve overseas) units. A 3rd Line was later formed to act as a reserve, providing trained replacements for the 1st and 2nd Line regiments.

1/1st Essex Yeomanry

The Essex Yeomanry was mobilised at the outbreak of war. The regiment joined the Royal Horse Guards and the 10th Royal Hussars in France in November 1914 as part of 8th Cavalry Brigade.

 

In April 1918, the 1/1st Essex Yeomanry was broken up as reinforcements for three other cavalry regiments. Lieutenant Colonel Whitmore of the EY was appointed to command the 10th Royal Hussars, the only Territorial officer without previous regular service to command a regular cavalry regiment. Other officers included members of the Towers family, whose descendants subsequently hung portraits of their menfolk in uniform at Ashridge, where they can still be seen today.

 

2/1st Essex Yeomanry

The 2/1st Essex Yeomanry was raised at Colchester and later served as garrison troops in Ireland during the war.

 

3/1st Essex Yeomanry

The 3/1st Essex Yeomanry was raised at Colchester and later absorbed into the 4th Reserve Cavalry Regiment in 1917.

 

Battles Engaged in during World War 1

 

Second Battle of Ypres

 

The Second Battle of Ypres was a battle of the First World War fought from 21 April – 25 May 1915 for control of the strategic Flemish town of Ypres in western Belgium, following the First Battle of Ypres the previous autumn. It marked the first mass use by Germany of poison gas on the Western Front. For the first time a former colonial force (the 1st Canadian Division) defeated a European power (the German Empire) on European soil, in the Battle of St. Julien and the Battle of Kitcheners' Wood.

 

Background

The Second Battle of Ypres consisted of six engagements:

 

The Battle of Gravenstafel: Thursday 22 April – Friday 23 April 1915

The Battle of Saint Julien: Saturday 24 April – 4 May

The Battle of Frezenberg: 8–13 May

The First Battle of Bellewaerde: 24–25 May

The Battle of Hooge 30–31 July 1915 (first German use of flamethrowers)

The Second Attack on Bellewaerde 25 September

The Ypres salient followed the canal and then bulged eastward around the town of Ypres, Belgium. North of the salient the Belgian army held the line of the Yser and the north end of the salient was held by two French divisions. The eastern part of the salient was defended by one Canadian division and two British divisions. The II Corps and V Corps of the Second Army comprised the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry divisions and the 4th Division, 27th Division, 28th Division, 50th Division, Lahore Division and 1st Canadian Division.

 

 

Battle of Gravenstafel (22–23 April 1915) 50.891°N 2.979°E Today this tiny hamlet is named s'Graventafel.

 

Ypres and Langemarck areas

At around 5:00 p.m. on 22 April, the German Army released 168 long tons (171 t) of chlorine gas over a 6.5 km (4.0 mi) front, on the part of the line held by French Territorial and colonial Moroccan and Algerian troops of the French 45th and 78th divisions. Poison gas had been used before at the Battle of Bolimov three months earlier but the gas liquified in the cold and became inert.

 

German troops carried 5,730 gas cylinders, weighing 90 pounds (41 kg) each, to the front by hand. The cylinders were opened by hand, relying on the prevailing winds to carry the gas towards enemy lines. Because of this method of dispersal, a large number of German soldiers were injured or killed in the process of carrying out the attack.

 

 

Belgian troops wearing early Gas Masks, 1915

The French troops in the path of the gas cloud had c. 6,000 casualties, many of whom died within ten minutes, primarily from asphyxiation and tissue damage in the lungs, many more were blinded. Chlorine gas forms hypochlorous acid when combined with water, destroying moist tissues such as lungs and eyes. The chlorine gas, being denser than air, quickly filled the trenches, forcing the troops to climb out into heavy enemy fire.

 

Many French troops ran for their lives, which kept them in the midst of the cloud, as others stood their ground and waited for the cloud to pass by. Few blamed the French survivors for abandoning their trenches, though many did lay blame on the French African troops who broke as indicative of their "unreliability, lack of discipline, and ineffectualness." Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, wrote:

 

...I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident. After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

 

a 4-mile (6.4 km) gap was left in the front line. The German High Command had not foreseen the effectiveness of the new weapon and all available troops had been transferred to Russia, leaving few reserves in the west. General von Falkenhayn, Chief of German General Staff had ordered the attack as a limited effort by the German 4th Army. German troops advanced at 5:00 p.m. but dusk, apprehension about the effect of the gas and lack of reserves prevented the Germans from exploiting the gap.[9] Canadian troops were able to defend the flank of the break-in by urinating into cloths and putting them to their faces to counter the effects of the gas. Casualties were especially heavy for the 13th Battalion of the CEF, which was enveloped on three sides and over-extended by the demands of securing its left flank once the Algerian Division had broken.

 

At Kitcheners' Wood, the 10th Battalion of the 2nd Canadian Brigade was ordered to counter-attack into the gap created by the gas attack. They formed up after 11:00 p.m. on the night of 22 April with the 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) of the 3rd Brigade arriving as they were forming to support the advance. Both battalions attacked with over 800 men, formed up in waves of two companies each at 11:46 p.m. Without reconnaissance, the battalions ran into obstacles half way to the objective and were engaged with small-arms fire from the wood, prompting an impromptu bayonet charge. Their attack cleared the former oak plantation of Germans, at the cost of 75% casualties.

 

The Germans set fire to a chemical product of sulphur chloride which they had placed in front of their own trenches, causing a thick yellow cloud to be blown towards the trenches of the French and Belgians. The cloud of smoke advanced like a yellow low wall, overcoming all those who breathed in poisonous fumes. The French were unable to see what they were doing or what was happening. The Germans then charged, driving the bewildered French back past their own trenches. Those who were enveloped by the fumes were not able to see each other half a yard apart. I have seen some of the wounded who were overcome by the sulphur fumes, and they were progressing favourably. The effect of the sulphur appears to be only temporary. The after-effects seem to be a bad swelling of the eyes, but the sight is not damaged.

 

The Daily Mail (26 April 1915)

Dusk was falling when from the German trenches in front of the French line rose that strange green cloud of death. The light north-easterly breeze wafted it toward them, and in a moment death had them by the throat. One cannot blame them that they broke and fled. In the gathering dark of that awful night they fought with the terror, running blindly in the gas-cloud, and dropping with breasts heaving in agony and the slow poison of suffocation mantling their dark faces. Hundreds of them fell and died; others lay helpless, froth upon their agonized lips and their racked bodies powerfully sick, with tearing nausea at short intervals. They too would die later – a slow and lingering death of agony unspeakable. The whole air was tainted with the acrid smell of chlorine that caught at the back of men's throats and filled their mouths with its metallic taste.

 

Captain Alfred Oliver Pollard, The Memoirs of a VC (1932) Battle of St Julien (24 April – 5 May)                                                     50.890°N 2.937°E (now Saint Juliaan)

 

Positions on about 30 April, before the British pullback

The village of St. Julien had been comfortably in the rear of the 1st Canadian Division until the poison gas attack of 22 April, when it became the front line. Some of the first fighting in the village involved a hasty stop, which included the stand of Lance Corporal Frederick Fisher of the 13th Battalion CEF's machine-gun detachment; who twice went out with a handful of men and a Colt Machine-gun and prevented advancing German troops from passing through St. Julien, into the rear of the Canadian front line; Fisher was killed the next day using the same tactics.

 

On the morning of 24 April the Germans released another cloud of chlorine, towards the re-formed Canadian line just west of St. Julien. Word was passed among the Canadian troops to urinate on their handkerchiefs and place these over their noses and mouths. The countermeasures were insufficient and German troops took the village.[16] Next day the York and Durham Brigade units of the Northumberland Division counter-attacked, failed to secure their objectives but established a new line closer to the village.

 On 26 April the Northumberland Brigade attacked again and gained a foothold in the village but were forced back with the loss of more than 1,940 casualties. The 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers had hundreds of casualties and with no respite took part in the battles at Frezenberg and Bellewaarde. On 24 May the battalion was subject to a German chlorine gas attack near St. Julien and was nearly annihilated.

 

The German Army first used chlorine gas cylinders in April 1915 against the French Army at Ypres. Yellow-green clouds drifted towards the Allied trenches. The gas had a distinctive smell, like pineapple and pepper. At first the French officers assumed that the German infantry were advancing behind a smoke screen and the troops were alerted. When the gas arrived at the Allied front-trenches soldiers began to complain about pains in the chest and a burning sensation in their throats.

 

 

 

Francis Alexander Caron Scrimger, V.C., M.D.

Capt. Scrimger, with the 2nd Canadian Field Ambulance, may have passed the order to use urine to counteract the gas  Soldiers realised they were being gassed and many ran as fast as they could. An hour after the attack had started there was a 1,500 yards (1,400 m) gap in the Allied line. As the German soldiers were apprehensive of the chlorine, few moved forward and the delay enabled Canadian and British troops to retake the position before the Germans could exploit the gap.

 

After the first German chlorine gas attacks, Allied troops were supplied with masks of cotton pads that had been soaked in urine. It was found that the ammonia in the pad neutralized the chlorine. These pads were held over the face until the gas dispersed. Other soldiers preferred to use handkerchiefs, a sock, a flannel body-belt, dampened with a solution of bicarbonate of soda, tied across the mouth and nose until the gas passed over. Soldiers found it difficult to fight like this and attempts were made to develop a better means of protecting men against gas attacks.[21] By July 1915 soldiers were given efficient gas masks and anti-asphyxiation respirators. Private W. Hay of the Royal Scots arrived in Ypres just after the chlorine gas attack on 22 April 1915.]

 

We knew there was something was wrong. We started to march towards Ypres but we couldn't get past on the road with refugees coming down the road. We went along the railway line to Ypres and there were people, civilians and soldiers, lying along the roadside in a terrible state. We heard them say it was gas. We didn't know what the Hell gas was. When we got to Ypres we found a lot of Canadians lying there dead from gas the day before, poor devils, and it was quite a horrible sight for us young men. I was only twenty so it was quite traumatic and I've never forgotten nor ever will forget it.

 

 

Private W. Hay of the Royal Scots

The French soldiers were naturally taken by surprise. Some got away in time, but many, alas! not understanding the new danger, were not so fortunate, and were overcome by the fumes and died poisoned. Among those who escaped nearly all cough and spit blood, the chlorine-attacking the mucous membrane. The dead were turned black at once. About 15 minutes after letting the gas escape the Germans got out of their trenches. Some of them were sent on in advance, with masks over their heads, to ascertain if the air had become breathable. Having discovered that they could advance, they arrived in large numbers in the area on which the gas had spread itself some minutes before, and took possession of the arms of the dead men. They made no prisoners. Whenever they saw a soldier whom the fumes had not quite killed they snatched away his rifle and advised him to lie down "to die better."

 

—The Daily Chronicle (26 April 1915) Battle of Frezenberg Ridge (8–13 May) 50.868°N 2.950°E

 

 

 

Front line after the British retirement, 24–25 May

The Germans moved field artillery forward and put three Army corps opposite the 27th and 28th divisions on Frezenberg ridge. The German attack began on 8 May, with a bombardment on the 83rd Brigade in trenches on the forward slope of the ridge but the first and second assaults by German infantry were repelled by the survivors. The third German assault of the morning pushed the defenders back. The neighbouring 80th Brigade repulsed the attack but the 84th Brigade was pushed back, leaving a 2-mile (3.2 km) gap in the line. The Germans were prevented from advancing further by counter-attacks and a night move by the 10th Brigade.

 

Battle of Bellewaarde (24–25 May) 50.847°N 2.950°E

 

On 24 May the Germans released a gas attack on a 7-kilometre (4.3 mi) front. British troops were able to defend against initial German attacks but eventually they were forced to retreat to the north and south. Failed British counterattacks forced a British retreat 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) northwards. Upon the end of the battle the Ypres salient was 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) deep.

 

By the end of the battle the Ypres Salient had been compressed and Ypres itself was closer to the line. The city was bombarded with observed artillery-fire and gradually demolished. Poison gas had been used on the Eastern Front but surprised the Allies and c. 7,000 gas casualties were admitted to field ambulances and casualty clearing stations; from May–June, 350 British deaths were recorded from gas poisoning. Both sides developed gas weapons and counter-measures which changed gas warfare to part of the structure of tactical attrition; the Franco-British used gas at the Battle of Loos in late September.Development of gas protection was instituted with the issue of improvised respirators made from a cotton-waste pad impregnated with sodium hyposulphite, sodium bicarbonate and glycerin. The respirator made little difference due to lack of training, the use of local contraptions and items imported from Britain which were poorly made. The "P helmet" (or "Tube Helmet") soaked in sodium phenate, had been issued by December 1915 and the PH helmet, which was effective against phosgene was issued in early 1916.

Canadian troops had achieved a defensive success but the division lost 5,975 men by the time it was withdrawn on 3 May. The division had been unprepared for the form of warfare prevailing on the Western Front, where linear tactics were insufficient against attackers armed with magazine-rifles and machine-guns; Canadian field artillery had been highly effective but the deficiencies of the Ross rifle made Canadian tactical difficulties worse. The Canadian Division received several thousand replacements shortly afterwards but presented a most favourable image to their allies and the world.

 

Casualties

German casualties from 21 April – 30 May were recorded as 34,933 by the Official Historians of the Reichsarchv. British casualties recorded in the British Official History were 59,275 men and the French had c. 18,000 casualties on 22 April and another 3,973 casualties from 26–29 April. Canadian casualties from 22 April – 3 May were 5,975 of whom c. 1,000 men were killed, the worst day being 24 April when 3,058 casualties were suffered during infantry attacks, artillery bombardments and gas discharges.

 

Battle of Loos

 

The Battle of Loos was the largest British offensive mounted in 1915 on the Western Front during World War I. The first British use of poison gas occurred and the battle was the first mass engagement of New Army units. The British offensive was part of the attempt by the French to break through the German defences in Artois and Champagne and restore a war of movement. Despite improved methods, more ammunition and better equipment the Franco-British attacks were contained by the German armies, except for local losses of ground. Casualties in the Herbstschlacht (Autumn Battle) were high on both sides.

 

Background

Strategic developments

The battle was the British component of the combined Anglo-French offensive known as the Third Battle of Artois. Field Marshal Sir John French and Haig (GOC British First Army), both of whom initially regarded the ground, overlooked by German-held slag heaps and colliery towers, as unsuitable for an attack, persuaded themselves that the Loos attack could succeed, perhaps as the use of gas would allow a decisive victory.

 

 

British offensive preparations

The battle also marked the third use of specialist Royal Engineer tunnelling companies, who deployed mines underground to disrupt enemy defence lines through the use of tunnels and the detonation of large amounts of explosives at zero hour.

 

British plan of attack

 

Battle of Loos, 1915

Sir John decided to keep a strong reserve consisting of the Cavalry Corps, the Indian Cavalry Corps and Haking's XI Corps, which consisted of the Guards Division and two New Army Divisions (21st and 24th) just arrived in France and a corps staff some of whom had never worked together or served on a staff before. Murray (Deputy CIGS) advised French that as troops fresh from training they were suited for the long marches of an exploitation rather than for trench warfare. French was privately doubtful that a breakthrough would be achieved. Haig (and Foch, Commander of the French Northern Army Group) wanted the reserves close to hand to exploit a breakthrough on the first day; French agreed to deploy them closer to the front but still thought they should be committed on the second day.

 

Haig's plans were limited by the shortage of artillery ammunition, which meant the preliminary bombardment, essential for success in the emerging trench warfare, was weak. Prior to the British attack, about 140 long tons (140,000 kg) of chlorine gas was released, with mixed success; in places the gas was blown back onto British trenches. Due to the inefficiency of the contemporary gas masks, many soldiers removed them as they could not see through the fogged-up talc eyepieces or could barely breathe with them on. This led to some British soldiers being affected by their own gas, as it blew back across their lines. Wanting to be closer to the battle, French had moved to a forward command post at Lilliers, less than 20 miles (32 km) behind First Army's front. He left most of his staff behind at GHQ and had no direct telephone link to First Army. Haig's infantry attacked at 6:30 a.m. on 25 September and he sent an officer by car requesting release of the reserves at 7:00 a.m.

 

Battle of the Hohenzollern Redoubt

The battle opened on 25 September. In many places British artillery had failed to cut the German wire in advance of the attack. Advancing over open fields within range of German machine guns and artillery, British losses were devastating. However, the British were able to break through the weaker German defences and capture the town of Loos, mainly due to numerical superiority. The inevitable supply and communications problems, combined with the late arrival of reserves, meant that the breakthrough could not be exploited. Haig did not hear until 10:02 a.m. that the divisions were moving up to the front. French visited Haig from 11:00–11:30 a.m. and agreed that Haig could have the reserve, but rather than using the telephone he drove to Haking's Headquarters and gave the order personally at 12:10 p.m. Haig then heard from Haking at 1:20 p.m. that the reserves were moving forward.

 

When the battle resumed the following day, the Germans were prepared and repulsed attempts to continue the advance. The reserves were committed against strengthened German positions. Rawlinson wrote to the King's adviser Stamfordham (28 September) "From what I can ascertain, some of the divisions did actually reach the enemy's trenches, for their bodies can now be seen on the barbed wire." The twelve attacking battalions suffered 8,000 casualties out of 10,000 men in four hours.[3] Sir John French told Foch on 28 September that a gap could be "rushed" just north of Hill 70, although Foch felt that this would be difficult to co-ordinate and Haig told him that First Army was in no position for further attacks. The fighting subsided on 28 September, with the British having retreated to their starting positions. Their attacks had cost over 20,000 casualties, including three divisional commanders; George Thesiger, Thompson Capper and Frederick Wing. Following the initial attacks by the British, the Germans made several attempts to recapture the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which was accomplished on 3 October. On 8 October, the Germans attempted to recapture much of the lost ground, by attacking with five regiments around Loos and part of the 7th Division on the left flank. Foggy weather inhibited observation, the artillery preparation was inadequate and the British and French defenders were well prepared behind intact wire; the German attack was repulsed with 3,000 casualties but managed to disrupt British attack preparations, causing a delay until 12/13 October. The British attempted a final attack on 13 October, which failed, due to a lack of hand grenades. General Haig thought it might be possible to launch another attack on 7 November but the combination of heavy rain and accurate German shelling during the second half of October finally persuaded him to abandon the attempt.

 

Major-General Richard Hilton, at that time a Forward Observation Officer, said of the battle:

 

A great deal of nonsense has been written about Loos. The real tragedy of that battle was its nearness to complete success. Most of us who reached the crest of Hill 70, and survived, were firmly convinced that we had broken through on that Sunday, 25th September 1915. There seemed to be nothing ahead of us, but an unoccupied and incomplete trench system. The only two things that prevented our advancing into the suburbs of Lens were, firstly, the exhaustion of the "Jocks" themselves (for they had undergone a bellyfull of marching and fighting that day) and, secondly, the flanking fire of numerous German machine-guns, which swept that bare hill from some factory buildings in Cite St. Auguste to the south of us. All that we needed was more artillery ammunition to blast those clearly-located machine-guns, plus some fresh infantry to take over from the weary and depleted "Jocks." But, alas, neither ammunition nor reinforcements were immediately available, and the great opportunity passed.

 

Air operations

The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) came under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Trenchard. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd wings under Colonels E. B. Ashmore, John Salmond and Sefton Brancker respectively, participated. As the British had a limited amount of artillery ammunition, the RFC flew target identification sorties prior to the battle to ensure that shells were not wasted. During the first few days of the attack, target-marking squadrons with better wireless transmitters, helped to direct British artillery onto German targets. Later in the battle pilots carried out a tactical bombing operation for the first time in history. Aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd wings dropped many 100-pound (45 kg) bombs on German troops, trains, rail lines and marshalling yards. As the land offensive stalled, British pilots and observers flew low over enemy positions, providing targeting information to the artillery.

 

MID - Mentioned in Dispatches

Maharaja and SIR Jung Bahadur's Grandson (Maharajkumar Gen. Padma Jung's son) was first Indian of Nepali-origin to be trained as commanding officer at RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He was commissioned as one of the First KCIO King's Commissioned Indian Officer. He later became Commander-in-Chief of Tripura Forces and retired as full Col. of British Raj. He fought gallantly in World War I. At the Battle of Loos he fought bravely and received five bullet wounds in his neck and upper shoulder. He was awarded many medals and honors during his long military career. His name was Rana Jodha Jung Bahadur. His titles read: Commander-in-Chief Tripura State Forces, Col. Rana Jodha Jung Bahadur, MBE; MIC, MID, GSM, Victory, Jubilee, War and Coronation Medals; KCIO 1st King Commissioned Officer. During World War I at the Battle of Loos, in the MID of British Military London News, following was mentioned:

 

Rana Jodha Jang Bahadur, who, in spite of being wounded, continued to lead his men against the Germans, and did not desist until a second wound in the neck rendered him unconscious. The Rana displayed great tenacity, leadership and conspicuous gallantry by leading his company right up to the German defenses in the face of heavy fire.

 

British infantry advancing through gas at Loos, 25 September 1915.

French had already been criticised before the battle and lost his remaining support in both the Government and Army as a result of the British failure at Loos and his perceived poor handling of his reserve divisions in the battle. He was replaced by Haig as Commander of the British Expeditionary Force in December 1915.

 

Casualties

British casualties in the main attack were 48,367 and 10,880 in the subsidiary attack, a total of 59,247 losses of the 285,107 casualties on the Western Front in 1915. Edmonds, the British Official Historian, gave German losses in the period 21 September – 10 October as c. 26,000 of c. 141,000 casualties on the Western Front, during the autumn offensives in Artois and Champagne. In Der Weltkrieg losses of the Sixth Army are given as 29,657 to 21 September; by the end of October losses had risen to 51,100 men and total German casualties for the autumn battles (Herbstschlacht) in Artois and Champagne were given as 150,000 men.

 

Commemoration

The Loos Memorial commemorates over 20,000 soldiers who fell in the battle and have no known grave. The community of Loos, British Columbia's name was changed to commemorate the battle. Several survivors wrote of their experiences, the poet Robert Graves described the battle and succeeding days in his war memoir Goodbye to All That. Author Patrick MacGill, who served as a stretcher-bearer in the London Irish and was wounded at Loos in October 1915, described the battle in his autobiographical novel The Great Push. J. N. Hall related his experiences in the British Army at Loos in Kitchener's Mob.

 

 

Victoria Cross 

Main article: Lists of Victoria Cross recipients

Daniel Laidlaw, 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers.

Frederick Henry Johnson, 73rd Field Company R. E., 15th Division.

Harry Wells, 2nd Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment.

Anketell Moutray Read, 1st Northamptonshire Regiment (posthumous).

Henry Edward Kenny, 1st Loyal North Lancs.

George Stanley Peachment, 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Arthur Vickers, 2nd Royal Warwickshire Regiment.                                                                                                                             George Maling, Royal Army Medical Corps.

Kulbir Thapa, 2nd Battalion 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles.

Rupert Price Hallowes, 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.

Angus Falconer Douglas-Hamilton, 6th Battalion, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.

Arthur Frederick Saunders, 9th Suffolk Regiment.

Robert Dunsire, 13th Battalion Royal Scots.

James Dalgleish Pollock, 5th Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.                                                                                                        Alexander Buller Turner, 3rd Royal Berkshire Regiment (posthumous).

Alfred Alexander Burt, 1/1st Battalion the Hertfordshire Regiment.

Arthur Fleming-Sandes, 2nd East Surrey Regiment.

Samuel Harvey, 1st York and Lancaster Regiment.

Oliver Brooks, 3rd Coldstream Guards.

James Lennox Dawson, 187th Company, Corps of Royal Engineers.

Geoffrey Vickers, The Sherwood Foresters.

 

 

Battle of Arras (1917)

Date 9 April – 16 May 1917

Location Near Arras, France

50°17′23″N 2°46′51″ECoordinates: 50°17′23″N 2°46′51″E

Result Indecisive; tactical Allied victory

British Empire  United Kingdom  Australia  Canada  Newfoundland  New Zealand

German Empire

Commanders and leaders

 Douglas Haig

 Edmund Allenby

 Hubert Gough

 Henry Horne Erich Ludendorff

 Ludwig von Falkenhausen

 Georg von der Marwitz

Strength on first day:

14 divisions in the assault,9 divisions in reserve on first day:

12 divisions in the line, 5 divisions in reserve

Casualties and losses

158,000 120,000–130,000

 

Western Front

The Battle of Arras (also known as the Second Battle of Arras) was a British offensive during the First World War. From 9 April to 16 May 1917, British, Canadian, South African, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and Australian troops attacked German defences near the French city of Arras on the Western Front. There were major gains on the first day, followed by stalemate. The battle cost nearly 160,000 British casualties and about 125,000 German casualties.

 

For much of the war, the opposing armies on the Western Front were at a stalemate, with a continuous line of trenches stretching from the Belgian coast to the Swiss border. In essence, the Allied objective from early 1915 was to break through the German defences into the open ground beyond and engage the numerically inferior German army in a war of movement. The Arras offensive was conceived as part of a plan to bring about this result. It was planned in conjunction with the French High Command, who were simultaneously embarking on a massive attack (the Nivelle Offensive) about eighty kilometres to the south. The aim of this combined operation was to end the war in forty-eight hours. At Arras the Allied objectives were to draw German troops away from the ground chosen for the French attack and to take the German-held high ground that dominated the plain of Douai.

 

The British effort was a relatively broad front assault between Vimy in the northwest and Bullecourt in the south-east. After considerable bombardment, Canadian troops advancing in the north were able to capture the strategically significant Vimy Ridge and British divisions in the centre were also able to make significant gains astride the Scarpe river. In the south, British and Australian forces were frustrated by the elastic defence and made only minimal gains. Following these initial successes, British forces engaged in a series of small-scale operations to consolidate the newly won positions. Although these battles were generally successful in achieving limited aims, these were gained at the price of relatively large numbers of casualties.

 

When the battle officially ended on 16 May, British Empire troops had made significant advances but had been unable to achieve a breakthrough. New tactics (embodied in SS. 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action and SS.143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action) and the equipment to exploit them, with the platoon becoming the principal tactical unit, in four sections: Lewis gun, rifle grenade, bomber and rifle; with the creeping barrage, the graze fuze and counter-battery fire had been used, particularly in the first phase and had demonstrated that set-piece assaults against heavily fortified positions could be successful. This sector then reverted to the stalemate that typified most of the war on the Western Front.

 

Contents   

1 Prelude

1.1 Political background

1.2 Strategic background

1.3 Opposing forces

2 Preliminary phase

2.1 Mining and tunnelling

2.2 Battle in the air

2.3 Creeping barrage

2.4 Counter-battery fire

3 First phase

3.1 First Battle of the Scarpe (9–14 April 1917)

3.2 Battle of Vimy Ridge (9–12 April 1917)

3.3 First Battle of Bullecourt (10–11 April 1917)

4 Second phase

4.1 Battle of Lagnicourt (15 April 1917)

4.2 Second Battle of the Scarpe (23–24 April 1917)

4.3 Battle of Arleux (28–29 April 1917)

4.4 Second Battle of Bullecourt (3–17 May 1917)

4.5 Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May 1917)

5 Aftermath

5.1 Casualties

5.2 Commanders

5.3 War Poetry

6 References

6.1 Notes

6.2 Bibliography

7 External links

 

Prelude

At the beginning of 1917, the British and French were still searching for a way to achieve a strategic breakthrough on the Western Front. The previous year had been marked by the costly success of the Franco–British offensive astride the river Somme, while the French had been unable to take the initiative because of intense German pressure at Verdun until after August 1916. Both battles consumed enormous quantities of resources while achieving virtually no strategic gains on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the cost to Germany of containing the Anglo-French attacks had been high, and given that the material preponderance of the Entente and its allies could only be expected to increase in 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided on a defensive strategy on the Western Front for that year. This impasse reinforced the French and British commanders' belief that to end the stalemate they needed a breakthrough; while this desire may have been the main impetus behind the offensive, the timing and location were heavily influenced by a number of political and tactical factors.

 

Political background

The mid-war years were momentous times. Governing politicians in Paris and London were under great pressure from the press, the people and their parliaments to bring the war to a victorious close.[9] The casualties from the battles of Gallipoli, the Somme and Verdun had been high and there was little prospect of victory in sight. The British prime minister, H. H. Asquith, resigned in early December 1916 and was succeeded by the "Welsh wizard", David Lloyd George. In France, premier Aristide Briand, with the redoubtable General (later Marshal) Hubert Lyautey as Minister of Defence, were politically diminished and resigned in March 1917.

 

The United States was close to declaring war on Germany; American public opinion was growing increasingly incensed by a long succession of high-profile U-boat attacks upon civilian shipping, starting with the sinking of RMS Lusitania in 1915 and culminating in the torpedoing of seven American merchantmen in early 1917. The United States Congress finally declared war on Imperial Germany on 6 April 1917, but it would be more than a year before a suitable army could be raised, trained, and transported to France.

 

Strategic background

Frontlines at Arras prior to the assault.

Although the French and British had intended to launch a 1917 spring assault, two developments put the plan in jeopardy. First, in February, Russia couldn't meet a commitment to a joint offensive, meaning that the planned two-front offensive would be reduced to a French-only assault along the Aisne River. Second, the German Army retreated to the Hindenburg line in Operation Alberich disrupting the tactical assumptions underlying the plans for the French offensive. In fact, until French troops advanced to compensate during the Battles of Arras, they encountered no German troops in the planned assault sector. Given these factors, it was initially uncertain whether the offensive would go forward. The French government desperately needed a victory to avoid civil unrest but the British were wary of proceeding in view of the rapidly changing tactical situation. In a meeting with David Lloyd George, French commander-in-chief General Nivelle was able to convince the British Prime Minister that if the British launched a diversionary assault to draw German troops away from the Aisne sector, the French offensive could succeed. It was agreed in the London Convention of 16 January that the French assault on the Aisne would begin in mid-April and that the British would make a diversionary attack in the Arras sector approximately one week prior.

 

Opposing forces

Three Allied armies were already concentrated in the Arras sector. They were deployed, roughly north to south, as follows: the First Army under Horne, the Third Army under Allenby, the Fifth Army under Gough. The overall British commander was Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and the battle plan was devised by General Allenby. Unusual for the First World War, three Scottish divisions (all of Third Army) were near each other for the start of the attack:- the 15th Scottish Division of VI Corps and 9th Scottish Division and 51st Highland Division of XVII Corps. The strongly Scottish-influenced 34th Division was also positioned in the midst of their Scottish XVII Corps neighbours.

 

Facing the British Empire forces were the Sixth Army under 73-year-old General von Falkenhausen and the Second Army under General von der Marwitz (who was recovering from an illness he had contracted on the Eastern Front). The armies had been organised as Gruppe Souchez, Gruppe Vimy and Gruppe Arras, deployed in that order north to south. Seven German Divisions were in the line; their remaining divisions were in reserve to reinforce or to counterattack as required.

 

General von Falkenhausen reported directly to General Erich Ludendorff, operational chief of the German High Command (the Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL). Ludendorff's staff contained several extremely capable officers, notably Major Georg Wetzell, Colonel Max Bauer and Captain Hermann Geyer. Since December 1916, Ludendorff's staff had been developing counter-tactics to oppose the new Allied methods that had been used at the Somme and Verdun. Although these battles were costly for the Allies, they also seriously weakened the German army. In early 1917 the German army was instructed to implement these counter-tactics (the Elastic Defence); Falkenhausen's failure to do so would prove disastrous.

 

Preliminary phase

The British plan was well developed, drawing on the lessons of the Somme and Verdun of the previous year. Rather than attacking on an extended front, the full weight of artillery would be concentrated on a relatively narrow stretch of eleven miles, from Vimy Ridge in the north to Neuville Vitasse, four miles south of the Scarpe river. The bombardment was planned to last about a week at all points on the line, with a much longer and heavier barrage at Vimy to weaken its strong defences. During the assault, the troops would advance in open formation, with units leapfrogging each other in order to allow them time to consolidate and regroup. Before the action could be undertaken, a great deal of preparation was required, much of it innovative.

 

Mining and tunnelling

Exit from the Allied military tunnels in the Carrière Wellington.

Since October 1916, the Royal Engineers had been working underground to construct tunnels for the troops. The Arras region is chalky and therefore easily excavated; under Arras itself is a vast network (called the boves) of caverns, underground quarries, galleries and sewage tunnels. The engineers devised a plan to add new tunnels to this network so that troops could arrive at the battlefield in secrecy and in safety. The scale of this undertaking was enormous: in one sector alone four Tunnel Companies (of 500 men each) worked around the clock in 18-hour shifts for two months. Eventually, they constructed 20 kilometres of tunnels, graded as subways (foot traffic only); tramways (with rails for hand-drawn trolleys, for taking ammunition to the line and bringing casualties back from it); and railways (a light railway system).[18] Just before the assault the tunnel system had grown big enough to conceal 24,000 men, with electric lighting provided by its own small powerhouse, as well as kitchens, latrines, and a medical centre with a fully equipped operating theatre. The bulk of the work was done by New Zealanders, including Maori and Pacific Islanders from the New Zealand Pioneer battalion, and Bantams from the mining towns of Northern England.

 

Assault tunnels were also dug, stopping a few metres short of the German line, ready to be blown open by explosives on Zero-Day. In addition to this, conventional mines were laid under the front lines, ready to be blown immediately before the assault. Many were never detonated for fear that they would churn up the ground too much. In the meantime, German sappers (military engineers) were actively conducting their own underground operations, seeking out Allied tunnels to assault and counter-mine. Of the New Zealanders alone, 41 died and 151 were wounded as a result of German counter-mining.

 

Most of the tunnels and trenches are currently off-limits to the public for reasons of safety. A 250 metre portion of the Grange Subway at Vimy Ridge is open to the public from May through November and the Wellington tunnel was opened to the public as the Carrière Wellington museum in March 2008.

 

 

Battle in the air

British machine gunners fire on German aircraft near Arras.

Although the Royal Flying Corps entered the Battle with inferior aircraft to the Luftstreitkräfte, this did not deter their commander, General Trenchard, from adopting an offensive posture. Dominance of the air space over Arras was essential for reconnaissance, and the British carried out many aerial patrols. Trenchard's aircraft, acting in support of ground forces, carried out artillery spotting, photography of trench systems and bombing. The reconnaissance activities were coordinated by the 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers. Aerial observation was hazardous work as, for best results, the aircraft had to fly at slow speeds and low altitude over the German defences. It became even more dangerous with the arrival of the "Red Baron", Manfred von Richthofen, with his highly experienced and better-equipped "Flying Circus" in March 1917. Its deployment led to sharply increased casualty rates among Allied pilots and April 1917 was to become known as Bloody April. One German infantry officer later wrote "during these days, there was a whole series of dogfights, which almost invariably ended in defeat for the British since it was Richthofen's squadron they were up against. Often five or six planes in succession would be chased away or shot down in flames". The average flying life of a Royal Flying Corps pilot in Arras in April was 18 hours. Between 4 and 8 April, the Royal Flying Corps lost 75 aircraft in combat, with the loss of 105 aircrew. The casualties created a pilot shortage and replacements were sent to the front straight from flying school: during the same period, 56 aircraft were crashed by inexperienced RFC pilots.

 

Creeping barrage

To keep enemy action to a minimum during the assault, a "creeping barrage" was planned. This requires gunners to lay down a screen of high explosive and shrapnel shells that creeps across the battlefield about one hundred metres in advance of the assaulting troops.[28] The Allies had previously used creeping barrages at the battles of Neuve Chapelle and the Somme but had encountered two technical problems. The first was accurately synchronising the movement of the troops to the fall of the barrage: for Arras, this was overcome by rehearsal and strict scheduling. The second was the barrage falling erratically as the barrels of heavy guns degrade swiftly but at differing rates during fire: for Arras, the rate of degradation of each gun barrel was calculated individually and each gun calibrated accordingly. While there was a risk of friendly fire, the creeping barrage forced the Germans to remain in their trenches, allowing Allied soldiers to advance without fear of machine gun fire.[28] Additionally, the new No. 106 instantaneous fuze had been developed for high-explosive shells so that they detonated on the slightest impact, vaporising barbed wire. Poison gas shells were used for the final minutes of the barrage.

 

Counter-battery fire

The principal danger to assaulting troops came from enemy artillery fire as they crossed no man's land, accounting for over half the casualties at the first day of the Somme. A further complication was the location of German artillery, hidden as it was behind the ridges. In response, specialist artillery units were created to attack German artillery. Their targets were provided by 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers, who collated data obtained from "flash spotting" and sound ranging. (Flash spotting required Royal Flying Corps observers to record the location of tell-tale flashes made by guns whilst firing. On Zero-Day, 9 April, over 80% of German heavy guns in the sector were neutralised (that is, "unable to bring effective fire to bear, the crews being disabled or driven off") by counter-battery fire. Gas shells were also used against the draught horses of the batteries and to disrupt ammunition supply columns.

 

First phase

The preliminary bombardment of Vimy Ridge started on 20 March; and the bombardment of the rest of the sector on 4 April. Limited to a front of only 24 miles (39 km), the bombardment used 2,689,000 shells, over a million more than had been used on the Somme. German casualties were not heavy but the men became exhausted by the endless task of keeping open dug-out entrances and demoralised by the absence of rations caused by the difficulties of preparing and moving hot food under bombardment. Some went without food altogether for two or three consecutive days.

 

By the eve of battle, the front-line trenches had ceased to exist and their barbed wire defences were blown to pieces. The official history of the 2nd Bavarian Reserve Regiment describes the front line as "consisting no longer of trenches but of advanced nests of men scattered about".[30] The 262nd Reserve Regiment history writes that its trench system was "lost in a crater field". To add to the misery, for the last ten hours of bombardment, gas shells were added.

 

Zero-Hour had originally been planned for the morning of 8 April (Easter Sunday) but it was postponed 24 hours at the request of the French, despite reasonably good weather in the assault sector. Zero-Day was rescheduled for 9 April with Zero-Hour at 05:30. The assault was preceded by a hurricane bombardment lasting five minutes, following a relatively quiet night.

 

When the time came, it was snowing heavily; Allied troops advancing across no man's land were hindered by large drifts. It was still dark and visibility on the battlefield was very poor. A westerly wind was at the Allied soldiers' backs blowing "a squall of sleet and snow into the faces of the Germans". The combination of the unusual bombardment and poor visibility meant many German troops were caught unawares and taken prisoner, still half-dressed, clambering out of the deep dug-outs of the first two lines of trenches. Others were captured without their boots, trying to escape but stuck in the knee-deep mud of the communication trenches.

 

First Battle of the Scarpe (9–14 April 1917)

18 pounder gun crew in action during the advance near Athies

A British machine gun post near Feuchy.

The major British assault of the first day was directly east of Arras, with the 12th Division attacking Observation Ridge, north of the Arras—Cambrai road. After reaching this objective, they were to push on towards Feuchy, as well as the second and third lines of German trenches. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Division began an assault south of the road, with the taking of Devil's Wood, Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines and the Bois des Boeufs as their initial objectives. The ultimate objective of these assaults was the Monchyriegel, a trench running between Wancourt and Feuchy, and an important component of the German defences. Most of these objectives, including Feuchy village, had been achieved by the evening of 10 April though the Germans were still in control of large sections of the trenches between Wancourt and Feuchy, particularly in the area of the heavily fortified village of Neuville-Vitasse. The following day, troops from the 56th Division were able to force the Germans out of the village, although the Monchyriegel was not fully in British hands until a few days later. The British were able to consolidate these gains and push forward towards Monchy-le-Preux, although they suffered heavy casualties in fighting near the village.

 

One reason for the success of the offensive in this sector was the failure of German commander von Falkenhausen to employ Ludendorff's new Elastic Defence. In theory, the enemy would be allowed to make initial gains, thus stretching their lines of communication. Reserves held close to the battlefield would be committed once the initial advance had bogged down, before enemy reinforcements could be brought up. The defenders would thus be able to counter-attack and regain any lost territory. In this sector, however, von Falkenhausen kept his reserve troops too far from the front and they were unable to arrive in time for a useful counter-attack on either 10 or 11 April.

 

Battle of Vimy Ridge (9–12 April 1917)

Canadian machine gun squad at Vimy Ridge.

At roughly the same time, in perhaps the most carefully crafted portion of the entire offensive, the Canadian Corps launched an assault on Vimy Ridge. Advancing behind a creeping barrage, and making heavy use of machine guns – eighty to each brigade, including one Lewis gun in each platoon – the corps was able to advance through about 4,000 yards (3,700 m) of German defences, and captured the crest of the ridge at about 13:00. Military historians have attributed the success of this attack to careful planning by Canadian Corps commander Julian Byng and his subordinate General Arthur Currie, constant training, and the assignment of specific objectives to each platoon. By giving units specific goals, troops could continue the attack even if their officers were killed or communication broke down, thus bypassing two major problems of combat on the Western Front.

 

First Battle of Bullecourt (10–11 April 1917)

German troops with British tank captured 11 April near Bullecourt.

South of Arras, the plan called for two divisions, the British 62nd Division and the Australian 4th Division to attack either side of the village of Bullecourt and push the Germans out of their fortified positions and into the reserve trenches. The attack was initially scheduled for the morning of 10 April, but the tanks intended for the assault were delayed by bad weather and the attack was postponed for 24 hours. The order to delay did not reach all units in time, and two battalions of the West Yorkshire Regiment attacked and were driven back with significant losses. Despite protests from the Australian commanders, the attack was resumed on the morning of 11 April; mechanical failures meant that only 11 tanks were able to advance in support, and the limited artillery barrage left much of the barbed wire in front of the German trenches uncut. Additionally, the abortive attack of the previous day alerted German troops in the area to the impending assault, and they were better prepared than they had been in the Canadian sector. Misleading reports about the extent of the gains made by the Australians deprived them of necessary artillery support and, although elements of the 4th Division briefly occupied sections of German trenches, they were ultimately forced to retreat with heavy losses. In this sector, the German commanders correctly employed the Elastic Defence and were therefore able to counter-attack effectively. The Germans acquired two of the tanks which had been used, and after seeing them perforated by armour-piercing bullets, believed the rifle A.P. bullet was an effective anti-tank weapon, which threw them off-guard.

 

Second phase

After the territorial gains of the first two days, a hiatus followed as the immense logistical support needed to keep armies in the field caught up with the new realities. Battalions of pioneers built temporary roads across the churned up battlefield; heavy artillery (and its ammunition) was manhandled into position in new gun pits; food for the men and feed for the draught horses was brought up, and casualty clearing stations were established in readiness for the inevitable counter-attacks. Allied commanders also faced a dilemma: whether to keep their exhausted divisions on the attack and run the risk of having insufficient manpower or replace them with fresh divisions and lose momentum.

 

In London, The Times commented: "the great value of our recent advance here lies in the fact that we have everywhere driven the enemy from high ground and robbed him of observation. Having secured these high seats [Vimy, Monchy and Croisailles] and enthroned ourselves, it is not necessarily easy to continue the rapid advance. An attack down the forward slope of high ground, exposed to the fire of lesser slopes beyond, is often extremely difficult and now on the general front ... there must intervene a laborious period, with which we were familiar at the Somme, of systemic hammering and storming of individual positions, no one of which can be attacked until some covering one has been captured".

 

The German press reacted similarly. The Vossische Zeitung, a Berlin daily newspaper, wrote: "We have to count on reverses like that near Arras. Such events are a kind of tactical reverse. If this tactical reverse is not followed by strategical effects i.e., breaking through on the part of the aggressor, then the whole battle is nothing but a weakening of the attacked party in men and materiel." The same day, the Frankfurter Zeitung commented: "If the British succeed in breaking through it will render conditions worse for them as it will result in freedom of operations which is Germany's own special art of war".

 

General Ludendorff, however, was less sanguine. The news of the battle reached him during his 52nd birthday celebrations at his headquarters in Kreuznach. He wrote: "I had looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence and was now deeply depressed". He telephoned each of his commanders and "gained the impression that the principles laid down by OHL were sound. But the whole art of leadership lies in applying them correctly". (A later court of inquiry would establish that Falkenhausen had indeed misunderstood the principles of the Elastic Defence.) Ludendorff immediately ordered reinforcements. Then, on 11 April, he sacked General von Falkenhausen's chief of staff and replaced him with his defensive line expert, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg. Von Lossberg went armed with a vollmacht (a power of attorney enabling him to issue orders in Ludendorff's name), effectively replacing Falkenhausen. Within hours of arriving, von Lossberg was restructuring the German defences.

 

During the Second Phase, the Allies continued to press the attack east of Arras. Their aims were to consolidate the gains made in the first days of the offensive to keep the initiative, and to break through in concert with the French at Aisne.[16] However, from 16 April onwards, it was apparent that the Nivelle Offensive was failing and Haig came under pressure to keep the Germans occupied in the Arras sector in order to minimise French losses.

 

Battle of Lagnicourt (15 April 1917)

Observing that the Australian 1st Division was holding a frontage of 13,000 yards (12,000 m), the local German Corps commander (General Otto Von Moser, commanding the German XIV Reserve Corps) planned a spoiling attack to drive back the advanced posts, destroy supplies and guns and then retire to the Hindenburg defences. Passing his plans to higher command, they assigned an extra division to his corps to further strengthen the attack.

 

Attacking with 23 battalions (from four divisions), the German forces managed to penetrate the Australian front line at the junction on the Australian 1st Division and Australian 2nd Division and occupy the village of Lagnicourt (damaging some Australian artillery pieces).

 

Counter-attacks from the Australian 9th and 20th Battalions restored the front line, and the action ended with the Australians suffering 1,010 casualties, against 2,313 German casualties.

 

Second Battle of the Scarpe (23–24 April 1917)

British 18-pounder battery under German fire close to Monchy-le-Preux, 24 April. In the foreground is an advanced dressing station

On 23 April, the British launched an assault east from Wancourt towards Vis-en-Artois. Elements of the 30th and the 50th Divisions made initial gains, and were in fact able to secure the village of Guémappe, but could advance no further east and suffered heavy losses. Farther north, German forces counter-attacked in an attempt to recapture Monchy-le-Preux, but troops from the Royal Newfoundland Regiment were able to hold the village until reinforcements from the 29th Division arrived. British commanders determined not to push forward in the face of stiff German resistance, and the attack was called off the following day on 24 April.

 

Battle of Arleux (28–29 April 1917)

Although the Canadian Corps had taken Vimy Ridge, difficulties in securing the south-eastern flank had left the position vulnerable. To rectify this, British and Canadian troops launched an attack towards Arleux-en-Gohelle on 28 April. Arleux was captured by Canadian troops with relative ease, but the British troops advancing on Gavrelle met stiffer resistance from the Germans. The village was secured by early evening but when a German counter-attack forced a brief retreat, elements of the 63rd Division were brought up as reinforcements and the village was held. Subsequent attacks on 29 April were repulsed. Despite achieving the limited objective of securing the Canadian position on Vimy Ridge, casualties were high, and the ultimate result was disappointing.

Men of 2nd Australian Light Trench Mortar Battery 8 May

 

Second Battle of Bullecourt (3–17 May 1917)

The Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt.

After the initial assault around Bullecourt failed to penetrate the German lines, British commanders made preparations for a second attempt. British artillery began an intense bombardment of the village, which by 20 April had been virtually destroyed. Although the infantry assault was planned for 20 April, it was pushed back a number of times and finally set for the early morning of 3 May. At 03:45, elements of the 2nd Division attacked east of Bullecourt village, intending to pierce the Hindenburg Line and capture Hendecourt-lès-Cagnicourt, while British troops from the 62nd Division attacked Bullecourt,which was finally taken by the British 7th Division and despite determined effort by the Germans was held by the British 62nd Division. German resistance was fierce and when the offensive was called off on 17 May, few of the initial objectives had been met. The Australians were in possession of much of the German trench system between Bullecourt and Riencourt-lès-Cagnicourt but had been unable to capture Hendecourt. To the west, British troops managed to push the Germans out of Bullecourt but incurred considerable losses, failing also to advance north-east to Hendecourt.

 

Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May 1917)]

See also: Capture of Oppy Wood

After securing the area around Arleux at the end of April, the British determined to launch another attack east from Monchy to try to break through the Boiry Riegel and reach the Wotanstellung, a major German defensive fortification. This was scheduled to coincide with the Australian attack at Bullecourt in order to present the Germans with a two–pronged assault. British commanders hoped that success in this venture would force the Germans to retreat further to the east. With this objective in mind, the British launched another attack near the Scarpe on 3 May. However, neither prong was able to make any significant advances and the attack was called off the following day after incurring heavy casualties. Although this battle was a failure, the British learned important lessons about the need for close liaison between tanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later apply in the Battle of Cambrai (1917).

 

British troops returning for a rest following the Battle of Arras.

By the standards of the Western front, the gains of the first two days were nothing short of spectacular. A great deal of ground was gained for relatively few casualties and a number of strategically significant points were captured, notably Vimy Ridge. Additionally, the offensive succeeded in drawing German troops away from the French offensive in the Aisne sector. In many respects, the battle might be deemed a victory for the British and their allies but these gains were offset by high casualties and the ultimate failure of the French offensive at the Aisne. By the end of the offensive, the British had suffered more than 150,000 casualties and gained little ground since the first day. Despite significant early gains, they were unable to effect a breakthrough and the situation reverted to stalemate. Although historians generally consider the battle a British victory, in the wider context of the front, it had very little impact on the strategic or tactical situation. Ludendorff later commented: "no doubt exceedingly important strategic objects lay behind the British attack, but I have never been able to discover what they were". In contradiction to this he was also "very depressed; had our principles of defensive tactics proved false, and if so, what was to be done?"

 

On the Allied side, twenty-five Victoria Crosses were subsequently awarded. On the German side, on 24 April 1917, Kaiser Wilhelm awarded Von Lossberg the Oakleaves (similar to a bar for a repeat award) for the Pour le Mérite he had received at the Battle of the Somme the previous September.

 

Casualties

Stained glass window by Harry Clarke in Wexford dedicated to the memory of Lt William Henry O'Keefe who was killed in action.

The most quoted Allied casualty figures are those in the returns made by Lt-Gen Sir George Fowke, Haig's adjutant-general. His figures collate the daily casualty tallies kept by each unit under Haig's command. Third Army casualties were 87,226; First Army 46,826 (including 11,004 Canadians at Vimy Ridge); and Fifth Army 24,608; totalling 158,660. German losses by contrast are more difficult to determine. Gruppe Vimy and Gruppe Souchez suffered 79,418 casualties but the figures for Gruppe Arras are incomplete. The writers of the German Official History Der Weltkrieg, recorded 78,000 British losses to the end of April and another 64,000 casualties by the end of May, a total of 142,000 men and 85,000 German casualties. German records excluded those "lightly wounded". Captain Cyril Falls (the writer of that part of the British Official History describing the Battles of Arras, Military Operations 1917 volume I) estimated that 30% needed to be added to German returns for comparison with the British. Falls makes "a general estimate" that German casualties were "probably fairly equal". Nicholls puts them at 120,000; and Keegan at 130,000. A notable non-casualty of the battle was C.S. Lewis (1898–1963), author of books including The Chronicles of Narnia. Although several sources list Lewis as having been wounded in April 1917, his autobiography makes it clear that he did not arrive in France until November of that year, and that his wounding near Arras took place in April 1918.

 

Commanders

Although Haig paid tribute to Allenby for the plan's "great initial success," Allenby's subordinates "objected to the way he handled the ... attritional stage". Allenby was sent to command the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine. He regarded the transfer as a "badge of failure" but he "more than redeemed his reputation by defeating" the Ottomans in 1917–18. Haig stayed in his post until the end of the war.

 

When it became apparent that a major factor in the British success was command failures within his own army, Ludendorff removed several staff officers, including General von Falkenhausen who never held a field command again, spending the rest of war as Governor-General of Belgium. In early 1918, The Times carried an article – entitled Falkenhausen's Reign of Terror – describing 170 military executions of Belgian civilians that had taken place since he had been appointed governor.

 

Ludendorff and Von Lossberg learned a major lesson from the battle. They discovered that although the Allies were capable of breaking through the front they could probably not capitalise on their success if they were confronted by a mobile, clever enemy. Ludendorff immediately ordered training in "war of movement" tactics and manoeuvre for his counter-attack divisions. Von Lossberg was soon promoted to general and directed the German defence in Haig's Flanders offensives of the summer and late autumn. (Von Lossberg was later to become "legendary as the fireman of the Western Front; always sent by OHL to the area of crisis").

 

War Poetry

Siegfried Sassoon makes reference to the battle in his famous anti-war poem The General in which is derided the incompetence of the British military staff. The Anglo-Welsh lyric poet Edward Thomas was killed by a shell on April 9, 1917, during the first day of the Easter Offensive. Thomas's war diary gives a vivid and poignant picture of life on the Western front in the months leading up to the battle.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Battle of St. Quentin Canal

 

The Battle of St Quentin Canal was a pivotal battle of World War I that began on 29 September 1918 and involved British, Australian and American forces in the spearhead attack and as a single combined force against the German Siegfried Stellung of the Hindenburg Line. Under the command of Australian general Sir John Monash, the assault achieved all its objectives, resulting in the first full breach of the Hindenburg Line, in the face of heavy German resistance and, in concert with other attacks of the Great Offensive along the length of the line convinced the German high command that the writing was on the wall regarding any hope of German victory.

 

Contents: 1) Prelude 2) Battle 3) Notes and references 4) External links

 

Prelude

After the German Spring Offensive, British, Commonwealth, French and American counterattacks (the Hundred Days Offensive) brought the Allies back up against the outposts of the Hindenburg Line close to the village of Bellicourt by the Autumn of 1918 (the Battle of Épehy).

 

American forces were ordered to attack on 27 September, to finish clearing German forces from outposts in front of the line. However, due to a shortage of American officers (there were only 18 officers in the 12 attacking companies – the remainder were absent receiving further training), the attack was unsuccessful. As a result of the confusion created by this attack (with the Corps command being unsure of where the American troops were), the attack on 29 September had to be started without the customary (and highly effective) artillery support – this was to have a large negative effect on the initial operations of the battle.

 

Battle

The British High Command had fully realised that any success against the formidable defences of the Hindenburg Line could only be achieved with the use of tanks.

 

On 29 September, the Australian Corps attacked, this time with the addition of two American Divisions from the American II Corps (the US 27th and 30th Divisions), supported by approximately 150 tanks of the 4th and 5th tank brigades (including the newly trained American 301st Heavy Tank Battalion). The US divisions launched the initial attack, with the Australian 3rd and 5th Divisions intended to "leapfrog" through the American forces. The inexperienced Americans did not clear German positions as effectively as they might have (due to the confusion created during the attack on 27 September). This forced the advancing Australians to fight for the ground that the Americans were planned to have already taken. In the confusion of battle, some American pockets that had been left without effective leadership willingly went along with the Australians as they advanced and there are documented accounts of soldiers from both nations fighting alongside each other in ad-hoc mixed outfits.

 

The British 46th Division crossed the St Quentin Canal (defended by fortified machine gun positions), capturing 4200 German prisoners (out of a total for the army of 5300). Men of the 1/6th Battalion, the North Staffordshire Regiment, led by Captain A. H. Charlton, seized the Riqueval Bridge over the canal on 29 September before the Germans could fire the explosive charges.

 

On 2 October the British 46th and 32nd Division supported by the Australian 2nd Division planned to capture the Beaurevoir Line (the 3rd line of defences of the Hindenburg Line), the village of Beaurevoir and the heights overlooking the Beaurevoir Line. While the attack succeeded in widening the breach in the Beaurevoir Line, it was unable to seize the high ground further on. However, by 2 October, the attack had resulted in a 17 km breach in the Hindenburg Line. By any measure, and especially by World War I standards, it was a stunning and swift victory.

Continuing attacks from 3 to 10 October (including the 2nd Division capturing Montbrehain on 5 October and the British 25th Division capturing the village of Beaurevoir on 5/6 October) managed to clear the fortified villages behind the Beaurevoir Line, and capture the heights overlooking the Beaurevoir Line – resulting in a total break in the Hindenburg Line.

 

PURSUIT TO MONS

 

Canada's Hundred Days

Canada’s Hundred Days was a series of attacks made along the Western Front by the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days Offensive of World War I. Reference to this period as Canada's Hundred Days is due to the substantial role the Canadian Corps of the British First Army played in causing the defeat and/or retreat of the German Army in a series of major battles from Amiens to Mons which along with other Allied offensives ultimately led to Germany's final defeat and surrender. During this time, the Canadian Corps fought at Amiens, Arras, the Hindenburg Line, the Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, Cambrai, Denain, Valenciennes and finally at Mons, on the final day of the First World War. In terms of numbers, during those 96 days the Canadian Corps' four over-strength or 'heavy' divisions of roughly 100 000 men, engaged and defeated or put to flight elements of forty seven German divisions, which represented one quarter of the German forces faced by the Allied Powers fighting on the Western Front. However their successes came at a heavy cost, the Canadians suffered 20% of their battle-sustained casualties of the war during the same period.

 

Contents   

1 Background

2 Battles

2.1 Battle of Amiens

2.2 Breaking the Hindenburg Line

2.3 Pursuit to Mons

3 Legacy and memorials

4 See also

5 References

5.1 Notes

5.2 Footnotes

 

6 Further reading

Background

 

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The German offensives on the Western Front beginning with Operation Michael in March 1918 had petered out by July. The Germans, recognizing their untenable position, withdrew from the Marne towards the north. At this time, Ferdinand Foch ordered the Allies to return to the offensive, as the Americans were in France, increasing the morale of the Allies. The British Army had also been reinforced by large numbers of troops returning from battles in Palestine and Italy. In addition, they received large numbers of replacements previously held back in Britain by Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Foch agreed on a proposal by Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), to strike on the Somme, east of Amiens and southwest of the 1916 battlefield of the Battle of the Somme. The Somme was chosen as a suitable site for the offensive for several reasons. As in 1916, it marked the boundary between the BEF and the French armies, in this case defined by the Amiens-Roye road, allowing the two armies to cooperate. The Canadian Corps was at this point part of the British Fourth Army under General Henry Rawlinson.

 

Battles

Battle of Amiens (1918)

The allied command had developed an understanding that the Germans had learned to suspect and prepare for an attack when they found the Canadian Corps moved in and massed on a new sector of the front lines. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George reflected this attitude when he wrote in his memoirs: “Whenever the Germans found the Canadian Corps coming into the line they prepared for the worst.”. A deception operation was devised to conceal and misrepresent the Canadians position in the front. A detachment from the Corps of two infantry battalions, a wireless unit and a casualty clearing station had been sent to the front near Ypres to bluff the Germans that the entire Corps was moving north to Flanders. Meanwhile, the majority of the Canadian Corps was marched to Amiens in secret Allied commanders included the notice "Keep Your Mouth Shut" into orders issued to the men, and referred to the action as a "raid" rather than an "offensive".To maintain secrecy, there was to be no pre-battle bombardment, only artillery fire immediately prior to the advance. The plan instead depended on large-scale use of tanks to achieve surprise, by avoiding a preliminary bombardment, a tactic successfully employed at the Battle of Hamel.

 

The battle began in dense fog at 4:20 am on 8 August 1918. Under Rawlinson's Fourth Army, the British III Corps attacked north of the Somme, the Australian Corps to the south of the river in the centre of Fourth Army's front, and the Canadian Corps to the south of the Australians. The French 1st Army under General Debeney opened its preliminary bombardment at the same time, and began its advance 45 minutes later. The operation was supported by more than 500 tanks, which helped to cut through the numerous barbed wire defences employed by the Germans.

 

The first day of the attack, August 8, saw the attacking forces broke through the German lines in dramatic fashion, with the Canadians pushing as far as 13 kilometres (8.1 mi) from their starting points. In many places the fog provided good cover for their advances in and through the furrows of the valley of the Luce river which ran through the centre of the Canadian's portion of the battlefield. The tanks were very successful in this battle, as they attacked German rear positions, creating panic and confusion. The swift advance led to a rapidly spreading collapse in German morale that ultimately led Erich Ludendorff to dub it "the Black Day of the German Army" when he was told of the psychological impact on his men.

 

Continuing to press the advantage gained on Day One, the advance continued for three more days but without the spectacular results of August 8, since the rapid advance outran the supporting artillery that could not be repositioned as quickly as the infantry advanced. By the 10th of August, the Germans had been forced to pull out of the salient that they had managed to occupy during Operation Michael in March, back towards the Hindenburg Line. Left without an enemy to fight or a plan to pursue the retreat the Allied advances in the Amiens sector including those of the Canadians petered out by 13 August and the Amiens operation was halted.

 

The Canadians remained on the scene at Amiens until 22 August, consolidating their gains and prepared to defend against counter-attack. On the 23rd they were summoned to pull out and go into the line east of Arras for an attack that was to commence three days later. There they were stationed in the villages of Fouquescourt, Maucourt, Chilly and Hallu from which they would attack eastward toward the Hindenburg Line.

 

At Amiens the four Canadian Divisions faced and defeated or put to flight ten full German Divisions and elements of five others that sat astride their boundaries with the Australians and French on either side of them. In the five earnest days of fighting between the 8th and 13th of August the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 artillery pieces, and over 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars. The deepest extent of penetration from their jumping off points was approximately 14 miles or 22.5 kilometres, and in total the Canadians liberated an area of more than 67 square miles/173.5 square kilometres which contained 27 towns and villages.

 

Breaking the Hindenburg Line

In Arras, the Canadians attacked eastward, smashing the outer defence lines near the powerful Drocourt-Quéant Line (the Wotan Stellung section of the Hindenburg line), along the Arras-Cambrai road. On September 2, 1918, the Canadian Corps, smashed the Drocourt-Quéant line, and broke its main support position, taking 5622 casualties, which brought the total losses of the Arras-Cambrai operation up to 11,423 casualties. After this, the Germans retreated across the Canal du Nord, which was almost completely flooded.

 

Canadian troops shelter in a ditch along the Arras-Cambrai road.

At the Battle of the Canal du Nord, following up the first breaking of the Hindenburg line, the Canadians used a complex manoeuvre to attack along the side of the canal through an unfinished dry section. The Canadians built bridges and crossed the canal at night, surprising the Germans with an attack in the morning. This proved the ability of Canadian engineers to construct new roads to cross the canal efficiently without the Germans noticing. The specialisation of troops and formally organised battalions of combat engineers was also effective as it allowed the soldiers to rest instead of working every day that they were not actively attacking.

 

The Canadians then broke the Hindenburg line a second time, this time during the Battle of Cambrai, which (along with the Australian, British and American break further south at the Battle of St. Quentin Canal) resulted in a collapse of German morale.

 

This collapse forced the German High Command to accept that the war had to be ended. The evidence of failing German morale also convinced many Allied commanders and political leaders that the war could be ended in 1918. (Previously, all efforts had been concentrated on building up forces to mount a decisive attack in 1919.)

 

Pursuit to Mons

As the war neared its end, the Canadian Corps pressed on towards Germany and the final phase of the war for the Canadians was known as the 'Pursuit to Mons'. It was during these final thirty-two days of the war that the Canadians engaged the retreating Germans over about seventy kilometres in a running series of battles at Denain and Valenciennes in France and finally Mons in Belgium where they pushed the Germans out of the town on November 10–11.[15] Mons was, ironically, where the British had engaged the German armies for the first time in battle in the Great War on August 23, 1914. As such, Mons is considered by some to be considered the place where the war both began and ended for the British Empire.

 

Some criticism was leveled at Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie by Sam Hughes and others for needlessly wasting lives to capture Mons once it was known that the armistice was imminent. They claimed the soldiers who were killed and wounded in taking Mons were sacrificed for not a strategic, but a symbolic objective. The allegations even appeared in print in newspapers run by Hughes' family which led to Currie launching and winning a libel lawsuit against Hughes' son Garnet and others after the war.

 

Legacy and memorials

Three war memorials stand in commemoration of the actions of the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days Offensive. The Battle of Amiens is commemorated by le Quesnel Memorial, the battle at the Drocourt-Quéant Line is commemorated by the Dury Memorial, and the Battles of the Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, Cambrai (1918) and the Pursuit to Mons is paid tribute by the Bourlon Wood Memorial. The Canadian liberation of Mons is commemorated on a plaque that is on display in the entrance of the City Hall of Mons, just off of the Grand Place.